The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy by Matthew Kroenig

Author:Matthew Kroenig
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2017-04-13T04:00:00+00:00

Strategic Stability: The Evidence

If the UELE argument from strategic stability theory is correct, then we should expect that nuclear inferior states will intentionally launch nuclear wars against states with superior nuclear arsenals. We should also expect that inferior states will engage in risky behavior in high-stakes crises to ensure that their nuclear weapons can be launched before they are destroyed. If, on the other hand, the argument of this book is correct, then we should expect that nuclear inferior states should never intentionally launch nuclear wars and they should be hesitant to run risks of nuclear war against nuclear superior adversaries.

Turning back to the empirical record reviewed in the first half of the book, we see that nuclear inferior states have frequently backed down in high-stakes crises with nuclear superior opponents. Nuclear inferior states have placed forces on alert in crises and have otherwise run risks of nuclear war, but they have been less, not more, likely to do so than their superior opponents. Nuclear inferior states have never issued a compellent threat against a nuclear superior opponent. And nuclear inferior states have never intentionally launched a nuclear war against a superior opponent due to UELE fears or for any other reason.

It is certainly possible that some future leader may intentionally launch nuclear weapons in order to avoid the risk that they will be destroyed in a nuclear attack. But logic and over 70 years of evidence give us strong reason to be skeptical that this is a likely outcome.

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